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Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

  • Barton L. Lipman

    (University of Western Ontario)

I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs at a state and show that the only such implications are those stemming from the weaker assumption of a common support. More precisely, given any model where priors have the same support and any finite $N$, there is another model with common priors which has the same $n^{\rm th}$ order beliefs for all $n\ne N$.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9703005.

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Date of creation: 21 Mar 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703005
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  1. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 2, pages 31-41 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  2. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 1988. "Common knowledge," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 118, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  3. Morris, Stephen, 1994. "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1327-47, November.
  4. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Nyarko, Yaw, 1991. "Most Games Violate the Harsanyi Doctrine," Working Papers 91-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
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