The No Trade Principle in General Environments
The no trade principle asserts that risk-neutral agents are not prepared to trade if and only if a common prior exists. The purpose of this article is to provide general versions of this principle. We first study the case when no topological assumption is made on the state space. Bets are uniform limits of bounded measurable functions. We then assume that the state space is completely regular Hausdorff and consider two cases in which bets are continuous functions and bounded continuous functions respectively
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