Relative Wages and the Returns to Education in the Labor Market for Registered Nurses
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniel Sullivan, 1989.
"Monopsony Power in the Market for Nurses,"
NBER Working Papers
3031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward J. Schumacher & Barry T. Hirsch, .
"Compensating Differentials and Unmeasured Ability in the Labor Market For Nurses: Why Do Hospitals Pay More?,"
9604, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
- Edward J. Schumacher & Barry T. Hirsch, 1997. "Compensating Differentials and Unmeasured Ability in the Labor Market for Nurses: Why Do Hospitals Pay More?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(4), pages 557-579, July.
- Phillips, V. L., 1995. "Nurses' labor supply: Participation, hours of work, and discontinuities in the supply function," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 567-582, December.
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