IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Stable cost sharing in production allocation games

Listed author(s):
  • Eric Bahel

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

  • Christian Trudeau

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Windsor)

Suppose that a group have demands for some good. Each one of them owns a technology to produce the good, with these technologies varying in their effectiveness. We consider technologies exhibiting either increasing return to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRS). In each case, we solve the issue of the efficient allocation of the production between the agents. In the case of IRS, we prove that it is always efficient to centralize the production of the good, whereas efficiency in the case of DRS typically requires to spread the production. We then show that there exist stable cost sharing mechanisms whether we have IRS or DRS. Finally, we characterize a family of stable mechanisms exhibiting no price discrimination (agents are charged the same price for each unit demanded). Under some specific circumstances, our method generates the full core of the problem.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1402.pdf
File Function: First version, 2014
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Windsor, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1402.

as
in new window

Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2014
Handle: RePEc:wis:wpaper:1402
Contact details of provider: Postal:
401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4

Phone: (519) 253-4232 ext 2368
Fax: (519) 973-7096
Web page: http://www.uwindsor.ca/economics/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Quant, Marieke & Borm, Peter & Reijnierse, Hans, 2006. "Congestion network problems and related games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 172(3), pages 919-930, August.
  2. Trudeau, Christian, 2009. "Cost sharing with multiple technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 695-707, November.
  3. Bahel, Eric & Trudeau, Christian, 2014. "Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 266-269.
  4. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2013. "A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 439-460, May.
  5. Rosenthal, Edward C., 2013. "Shortest path games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(1), pages 132-140.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wis:wpaper:1402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Trudeau)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.