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Cost Sharing In Networks: Some Open Questions

Author

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  • HERVÉ MOULIN

    (Department of Economics, Rice University, MS 22, PO Box 1892 Houston, Texas 77251-1892, USA)

Abstract

The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an axiomatic discussion of fair division in the latter problems, where Stand Alone objections are not implementable. But the computational complexity of optimal solutions is still a very severe obstacle to this approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Moulin, 2013. "Cost Sharing In Networks: Some Open Questions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:02:n:s021919891340001x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021919891340001X
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1994. "On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems," Other publications TiSEM 56ea8c64-a05f-4b3f-ab61-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1994. "On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems," Discussion Paper 1994-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1994. "Minimum cost spanning extension problems : The proportional rule and the decentralized rule," Other publications TiSEM 2c6cd46b-7e72-4262-a479-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Munich, Léa, 2024. "Schedule situations and their cooperative game theoretic representations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 316(2), pages 767-778.
    2. Andreas Darmann & Christian Klamler, 2014. "Knapsack cost sharing," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(3), pages 219-241, September.
    3. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Kronborg, Dorte & Smilgins, Aleksandrs, 2017. "Fair division of costs in green energy markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 220-230.
    4. Ruben Juarez & Michael Wu, 2019. "Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, April.
    5. Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan & Jason R. Marden & Adam Wierman, 2014. "Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 1252-1296, November.
    6. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moulin, Hervé, 2014. "Sharing the cost of redundant items," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 339-352.
    7. Gildas Sédry Fopa & Issofa Moyouwou & Joseph Siani, 2022. "Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 567-587, April.
    8. M. A. Hinojosa & A. Caro, 2021. "A non-cooperative game theory approach to cost sharing in networks," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 94(2), pages 219-251, October.
    9. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2018. "Stable cost sharing in production allocation games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 25-53, June.
    10. Patrick Harless, 2017. "Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 755-781, March.
    11. Léa Munich, 2023. "Schedule Situations and their Cooperative Game Theoretic Representations," Working Papers 2023-08, CRESE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; networks; combinatorial optimization; C71; D62; D63;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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