Folk solution for simple minimum cost spanning tree problems
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- Subiza, Begoña & Giménez, José Manuel & Peris, Josep E., 2015. "Folk solution for simple minimum cost spanning tree problems," QM&ET Working Papers 15-7, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
References listed on IDEAS
- Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1994. "On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems," Discussion Paper 1994-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bergantinos, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007.
"A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 326-352, November.
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems," Game Theory and Information 0504001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gustavo Bergantinos & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2008. "On Some Properties of Cost Allocation Rules in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(3), pages 251-267, December.
- Estévez-Fernández, Arantza & Reijnierse, Hans, 2014.
"On the core of cost-revenue games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 237(2), pages 606-616.
- Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Hans Reijnierse, 2012. "On the Core of Cost-Revenue Games: Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-101/II, Tinbergen Institute.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Christian Trudeau & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2017. "Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," Working Papers 1705, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsJocs cooperatius; Economia del benestar; Elecció social; 33 - Economia;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-05-14 (All new papers)
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