The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by only using linear programming. We show that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all equilibrium assignments, and vice versa. We also show that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure and we study how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.
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- Camina, Ester, 2006.
"A generalized assignment game,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 152-161, September.
- Sotomayor, Marilda, 2003. "Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 261-265, December.
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- Marilda Sotomayor, 1999. "The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 567-583.
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- Fagebaume, Alexis & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2010. "A note on the multiple partners assignment game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 388-392, July.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December.
- Sotomayor, Marilda, 2007. "Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 155-174, May.
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