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The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

  • Marina Nunez Oliva
  • Carlos Rafels Pallarola

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game.

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Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 65.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:200165
Contact details of provider: Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es

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  1. A. van den Nouweland & P. Borm & W. van Golstein Brouwers & R. Groot Bruinderink & S. Tijs, 1996. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 294-303, February.
  2. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
  3. van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Golstein Brouwers, W. & Groot Bruinderink, R. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "A game theoretic approach to problems in telecommunication," Other publications TiSEM a3b30529-fe17-484c-8eab-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  4. repec:dgr:kubcen:199943 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Marilda Sotomayor, 1999. "The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 567-583.
  6. TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
  7. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
  8. Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J., 1999. "On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games," Discussion Paper 1999-43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72854 is not listed on IDEAS
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