The extreme core allocations of the assignment game
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- TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
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More about this item
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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