Platform Competition with “Must-Have” Components
In platform-component systems with indirect network effects, some components are so popular with consumers that they have strong bargaining positions and can be regarded as “must-have” from the point of view of the platform. For example, ESPN is a must-have component of cable TV platforms. This paper presents a theoretical model to assess how platform market structures affect the likelihood of exclusive versus non-exclusive contracts between platforms and components. The model evaluates the combined impacts of (i) the popularity of the component, (ii) the platform market share difference and (iii) platform technological compatibility on the platform-component contractual arrangements. It shows that a component provider is more likely to sign exclusive access contracts with a single platform if its popularity is high, the platform market share difference is large, and platform compatibility is low.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PAC 123, 238 Church Street, Middletown, CT 06459-0007|
Web page: http://www.wesleyan.edu/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, 2000.
"Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 25-51, 03.
- Church, J. & Gandal, N., 1996. "Systems Competition, Vertical Merger and Foreclosure," Papers 6-96, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Church, Jeffrey & Gandal, Neil, 1992. "Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 85-103, March.
- Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
- Chou, Chien-fu & Shy, Oz, 1990. "Network effects without network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 259-270, June.
- Chou, Chien-fu & Shy, Oz, 1996. "Do consumers gain or lose when more people buy the same brand," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 309-330, September.
- Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, 1988. ""Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, Summer.
- Clements, Matthew T., 2004. "Direct and indirect network effects: are they equivalent?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 633-645, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2004-003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manolis Kaparakis)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.