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Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution may Benefit the TV-viewers

Author

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  • Stennek, Johan

    () (Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

Abstract

Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded

Suggested Citation

  • Stennek, Johan, 2007. "Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution may Benefit the TV-viewers," Working Paper Series 691, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0691
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Madden & Mario Pezzino, 2013. "Sports League Quality, Broadcaster TV Rights Bids and Wholesale Regulation of Sports Channels," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1304, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    2. Chenghuan Sean Chu, 2008. "The effect of satellite entry on product quality for cable television," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-12, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Christiaan Hogendorn & Stephen Ka Yat Yuen, 2009. "PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH 'MUST-HAVE' COMPONENTS -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 294-318, June.
    4. Viktória Kocsis & Paul Bijl, 2007. "Network neutrality and the nature of competition between network operators," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-184, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exclusive Contracts; Quality; Bargaining; Avertising; Investment;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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