Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI
The fact that China is the second largest recipient of FDI in the world has been heralded by economists and government officials alike as one of the crowning achievements of Chinese economy. This paper questions this perspective. The paper focuses on FDI from ethnically Chinese economies (ECEs), which has financed China's labor-intensive industries and its export growth. First, the paper shows that the conventional wisdom about why China attracts so much labor-intensive FDI is flawed. Second, the paper offers what might be called an institutional foundation argument to explain the phenomenon of China's labor-intensive FDI. Labor-intensive FDI, according to this argument, is fundamentally driven by a political pecking order of firms in China that systematically disadvantages indigenous private firms both financially and legally. Labor-intensive FDI rises to alleviate the liquidity constraints afflicting Chinese private firms as efficient private entrepreneurs have no choice but to cede their claims o in future cashflows to raise financing for their businesses.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2001|
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