Children and intra-household inequality : a theoretical analysis

Arguing that resources within the household are not allocated according to need, several researchers have tried to model intra-household allocative behavior. One group (1990) argued that as households become better off, intra-household inequality first increases then decreases. The behavior of intra-household inequality as household welfare improves is clearly important for policy, as interventions are often restricted to the household level - although the objective is to improve the welfare of the least-well-off individual. The author shows here that many of the tractable derivations of intra-household resource allocation are available in what might be called the"linear expenditure systems"framework. He analyzes the relationship between intra-household inequality and total household resources for models of intra-household allocation that lead to a linear expenditure reduced form. He then investigates three structural models : household welfare maximization; cooperative bargaining; and a noncooperative game with children as public goods. The author indicates how these models should be modified to produce reduced forms that are better represented in the evidence.