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Sovereign defaults and expropriations : empirical regularities

Author

Listed:
  • Eden, Maya
  • Kraay, Aart
  • Qian, Rong

Abstract

This paper uses a large cross-country dataset to empirically examine factors associated with sovereign defaults on external private creditors and expropriation of foreign direct investments in developing countries since the 1970s. In the long run, sovereign defaults and expropriations are likely to occur in the same countries. In the short run, however, these events are uncorrelated. Defaults are more likely to occur following periods of rapid debt accumulation, when growth is low, and in countries with weak policy performance, and defaults are not strongly persistent over time. In contrast, expropriations are not systematically related to the level of foreign direct investment, to growth, or to policy performance. Expropriations are however less likely under right-wing governments, and are strongly persistent over time. There is also little evidence that a history of recent defaults is associated with expropriations, and vice versa. The paper discusses the implications of these findings for models that emphasize retaliation as means for sustaining sovereign borrowing and foreign investment in equilibrium, as well as the implications for political risk insurance against the two types of events.

Suggested Citation

  • Eden, Maya & Kraay, Aart & Qian, Rong, 2012. "Sovereign defaults and expropriations : empirical regularities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6218, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6218
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Guido Sandleris & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "GDP-Indexed Bonds: A Tool to Reduce Macroeconomic Risk?," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    2. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    3. Ewald Nowotny, 2013. "Opening Address SUERF/OeNB/BWG Conference on ‘The Future of Sovereign Borrowing in Europe’," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    4. Hans J. Blommestein, 2013. "Forces Shaping the OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook with Emphasis on the Challenges for European Sovereign Issuers," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    5. Ulrich Bindseil, 2013. "The Role of Sovereign Debt in Monetary Policy Implementation – An International Comparative Perspective," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    6. repec:udt:wpbsdt:nombre_del_archivo is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan & Johannes Holler, 2013. "Introduction and Key Findings," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    8. Dreher, Axel & Fuchs, Andreas & Parks, Bradley & Strange, Austin M. & Tierney, Michael J., 2016. "Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa," Working Papers 0620, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    9. Alessandro Missale, 2013. "The Future of Sovereign Borrowing in Europe," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
      • Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan & Johannes Holler & Ulrich Bindseil & Nicolas Sauter & Hans J. Blommestein & Maria Cannata & Juha Kilponen & Alessandro Missale & Ewald Nowotny & Guido Sandleris & Mark L., 2013. "The Future of Sovereign Borrowing in Europe," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2013/5 edited by Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan & Johannes Holler.
    10. Juha Kilponen, 2013. "European Debt Crisis and Crisis Resolution Policies," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    11. Nose, Manabu, 2014. "Triggers of contract breach : contract design, shocks, or institutions ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6738, The World Bank.
    12. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2013. "On the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 649-667, WINTER.
    13. Maria Cannata, 2013. "Risk Management of a Public Debt Portfolio: The Italian Experience," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.

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    Keywords

    Debt Markets; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress; External Debt; Emerging Markets; Investment and Investment Climate;

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