Equitable provision of long-term public goods: the role of negotiation mandates
In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties'willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ghersi, Frederic & Hourcade, Jean-Charles, 2001. "The Economics of a Lost Deal," Discussion Papers dp-01-48-, Resources For the Future.
- Schelling, Thomas C, 1992. "Some Economics of Global Warming," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 1-14, March.
- Guesnerie, R., 1995.
"The genealogy of modern theoretical public economics: From first best to second best,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 353-381, April.
- Guesnerie, R., 1994. "The Genealogy of Modern Theoretical Public Economics: From first best to second best," DELTA Working Papers 94-25, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Christian Azar, 1999. "Weight Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(3), pages 249-268, April.
- John, A Andrew & Pecchenino, Rowena A, 1997. " International and Intergenerational Environmental Externalities," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(3), pages 371-87, September.
- Joseph Stiglitz, 1998. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
- Sandler, Todd & Smith, V. Kerry, 1976. "Intertemporal and intergenerational Pareto efficiency," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 151-159, February.
- Chao, Hung-po & Peck, Stephen, 2000. "Greenhouse gas abatement: How much? and Who pays?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-20, January.
- Schelling, Thomas C, 1995. "Intergenerational discounting," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4-5), pages 395-401.
- World Bank, 2002. "World Development Indicators 2002," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13921, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3180. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.