Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
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- Lo Prete, Anna & Revelli, Federico, 2017. "Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 10-13.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Federico Revelli & Roberto Zotti, 2019.
"The sacred and the profane of budget cycles: evidence from Italian municipalities,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(6), pages 1446-1477, December.
- Revelli, Federico & Zotti, Roberto, 2018. "The Sacred and the Profane of Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201816, University of Turin.
- Lo Prete, Anna, 2024. "Digital and financial literacy and the development of e-government platforms," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 202411, University of Turin.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2017-07-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2017-07-09 (Economic Design)
- NEP-POL-2017-07-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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