Adding Ideology to the Equation: New Predictions for Election Results under Compulsory Voting
This paper provides new predictions for compulsory elections, taking into consideration the differences in ideological views between compulsory and voluntary voters. Having explored Brazil's dual voting system, I predict changes in Americans' preferences and estimate a voting model applied to US senatorial elections. I find that, if the current voting population had ideological preferences of a compulsory electorate, Democrats would gain 8.7 percentage points in their vote shares and win 68% of the elections. Moreover, candidates that are voted for less would be the ones that gain more votes under compulsory elections, while this system would be most detrimental for highly voted-for candidates. Another consequence includes the candidates' reaction while converging in the ideological spectrum.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 1603 591131
Fax: +44(0)1603 4562592
Web page: http://www.uea.ac.uk/economics
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Jessica Pointer, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2011.
"Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(2), pages 183 - 211.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994.
"Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information,"
1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
- Mullainathan, Sendhil & Washington, Ebonya, 2007.
"Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance Voting,"
14, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Ebonya Washington & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2009. "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 86-111, January.
- Sendhil Mullainathan & Ebonya Washington, 2006. "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Voting," NBER Working Papers 11910, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Train,Kenneth E., 2009.
"Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521766555.
- Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2006.
"A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007.
- Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2011. "A Structural Model Of Turnout And Voting In Multiple Elections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-245, 04.
- Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Aug 2006.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uea:aepppr:2012_44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alasdair Brown)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.