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Surplus-Value, Distribution and Exploitation

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  • Alberto Battistini

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Abstract

This paper introduces a notion of exploitation according to which participants in a cooperative production process are exploited to the extent that their earnings coincide with what they would earn from independent participation in the production process. This notion is then used to show that, in general, the institutional structure of production is not the solution to the problem of (opportunistic) exploitation, but may instead be the condition itself for its occurrence. Starting from the observation that surplus-value is almost always created by the collective undertaking of non additively separable investments, the key to the result is to take groups as units of analysis in a Marx-inspired framework driven by the evolutionary principle of differential, multilevel profit realization

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Battistini, 2007. "Surplus-Value, Distribution and Exploitation," Department of Economics University of Siena 518, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:518
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    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/518.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    between-group competition; within-group competition; intra-group relationships; inter-group relationships; efficiency-enhancing distribution.;

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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