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Micro-Founded Institutions and Macro-Founded Individuals: The Dual Nature of Profit

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  • Alberto Battistini

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Abstract

Starting from the observation that surplus-value is almost always due to the collective undertaking of non additively separable human capital investments, this paper introduces a theory of the institutional structure of production where groups are taken as units of analysis in a multi-level competition framework inspired by Marx’s critique of the ‘abstract man’. The main result is that monopoly profit is not the only meaningful notion of profit besides the value of individual contribution and, as a consequence, freeentry and competition do not necessarily wipe it out

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Battistini, 2008. "Micro-Founded Institutions and Macro-Founded Individuals: The Dual Nature of Profit," Department of Economics University of Siena 550, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:550
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    value; power; conflict; competition; social classes;

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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