Toward a theory of labor market institutions
Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmful for job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodox reforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because of political opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why we observe such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in a forthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred for further details.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul R. Krugman, 1994.
"Past and prospective causes of high unemployment,"
Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Jan, pages 49-98.
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1994.
"Unemployment, wage rigidity, and the returns to education,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 535-543, April.
- Saint-Paul, G., 1993. "Unemployment, Wage Rigidity, and the Returns to Education," DELTA Working Papers 93-11, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.