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Property titling and conveyancing

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes titling institutions and the regulation of supporting conveyancing services. After examining the tradeoff of enforcement benefits and consent costs posed by property rights, it explains how different public titling systems (privacy, recording and registration) try to solve this tradeoff, and what the consequences are for the nature and regulation of private conveyancing services. The chapter ends with a discussion of some empirical issues and data which are useful for comparing, designing and managing titling and conveyancing systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Benito Arruñada, 2009. "Property titling and conveyancing," Economics Working Papers 1177, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1177
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; enforcement; transaction costs; registries; lawyers; notaries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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