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The Cost of Registering Property: Does Legal Origin Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Mohammad Amin

    (BM = WB - La Banque Mondiale = The World Bank - WBG = GBM - World Bank Group = Groupe Banque Mondiale)

  • Jamal Ibrahim Haidar

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

There is a large literature that finds that common law countries perform better than civil law countries in various aspects of the institutional environment. This article extends these findings to another dimension of institutional quality--the cost of registering property. In a sample of 121 countries, we find that the cost of registering property is lower by 26 percent of the world average in common law compared with civil law countries, a result largely driven by differences in non-notary costs of registering property. We provide plausible explanations for these findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohammad Amin & Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, 2012. "The Cost of Registering Property: Does Legal Origin Matter?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00966171, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00966171
    DOI: 10.1007/s00181-011-0479-7
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bjuggren, Per-Olof & Högberg, Andreas, 2012. "Legal Origin and Firm Size Effects Around the World," Ratio Working Papers 191, The Ratio Institute.
    2. Vahagn Jerbashian & Anna Kochanova, 2016. "The impact of doing business regulations on investments in ICT," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 991-1008, May.
    3. Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim, 2012. "The impact of business regulatory reforms on economic growth," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 285-307.
    4. Mohammad Amin & Jamal Haidar, 2014. "Trade facilitation and country size," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 1441-1466, December.
    5. Jamal Ibrahim Haidar & Takeo Hoshi, "undated". "Implementing Structural Reforms in Abenomics: How to Reduce the Cost of Doing Business in Japan," Working Paper 316046, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    6. Benito Arruñada, 2009. "Property titling and conveyancing," Economics Working Papers 1177, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Ferreira, Frederico Poley Martins & Ávila, Paulo Coelho, 2018. "Who has secure land tenure in the urban areas of Brazil? Evidence from the state of Minas Gerais," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 494-504.
    8. Shanji Xin & Keun Lee, 2025. "Big businesses versus institutions for entrepreneurship: new firm creation and growth in China," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 475-507, June.
    9. Junrong Ma & Li Tian & Yudi Zhang & Xin Yang & Yongfu Li & Ziang Liu & Lin Zhou & Zixuan Wang & Wei Ouyang, 2024. "Global property rights and land use efficiency," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 15(1), pages 1-14, December.
    10. Elena Sochirca & Francisco José Veiga, 2021. "Key determinants of elite rivalry: theoretical insights and empirical evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(2), pages 277-291, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law

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