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Conservatism and Liquidity Traps

Author

Listed:
  • Taisuke Nakata

    (Federal Reserve Board)

  • Sebastian Schmidt

    (European Central Bank)

Abstract

In an economy with an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off for discretionary central banks between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. Appointing Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB and enhances welfare by improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB.

Suggested Citation

  • Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2014. "Conservatism and Liquidity Traps," UTokyo Price Project Working Paper Series 059, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics, revised Jul 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:upd:utppwp:059
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anton Nakov, 2008. "Optimal and Simple Monetary Policy Rules with Zero Floor on the Nominal Interest Rate," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(2), pages 73-127, June.
    2. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Johannes Wieland, 2012. "The Optimal Inflation Rate in New Keynesian Models: Should Central Banks Raise Their Inflation Targets in Light of the Zero Lower Bound?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1371-1406.
    3. Niemann, Stefan, 2011. "Dynamic monetary–fiscal interactions and the role of monetary conservatism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 234-247.
    4. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    5. Gauti Eggertsson & Bulat Gafarov & Saroj Bhatarai, 2014. "Time Consistency and the Duration of Government Debt: A Signalling Theory of Quantitative Easing," 2014 Meeting Papers 1292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Braun, R. Anton & Korber, Lena Mareen & Waki, Yuichiro, 2013. "Small and orthodox fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2013-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    7. Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, . "Gradualism and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Tambakis, Demosthenes N., 2014. "On the risk of long-run deflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 176-181.
    9. Burgert, Matthias & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2014. "Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 282-299.
    10. Sebastian Schmidt, 2013. "Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(7), pages 1335-1350, October.
    11. Richter Alexander W. & Throckmorton Nathaniel A., 2015. "The zero lower bound: frequency, duration, and numerical convergence," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-26, January.
    12. Jung, Taehun & Teranishi, Yuki & Watanabe, Tsutomu, 2005. "Optimal Monetary Policy at the Zero-Interest-Rate Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 813-835, October.
    13. repec:wly:jmoncb:v:49:y:2017:i:4:p:695-732 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Johannes Wieland, 2012. "The Optimal Inflation Rate in New Keynesian Models: Should Central Banks Raise Their Inflation Targets in Light of the Zero Lower Bound?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1371-1406.
    15. Eggertsson, Gauti B., 2006. "The Deflation Bias and Committing to Being Irresponsible," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(2), pages 283-321, March.
    16. Armenter, Roc, 2013. "The perils of nominal targets," Working Papers 14-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 04 Feb 2014.
    17. Mendes, Rhys R., 2011. "Uncertainty and the Zero Lower Bound: A Theoretical Analysis," MPRA Paper 59218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Sebastian Schmidt, 2017. "Fiscal Activism and the Zero Nominal Interest Rate Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(4), pages 695-732, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mengus, Eric & Barthelemy, Jean, 2016. "The Signaling Effect of Raising Inflation," HEC Research Papers Series 1162, HEC Paris, revised 09 Jan 2017.
    2. Seneca, Martin, 2016. "Risk shocks close to the zero lower bound," Bank of England working papers 606, Bank of England.
    3. Tambakis, Demosthenes N., 2015. "Determinate liquidity traps," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 126-132.
    4. Nakata, Taisuke, 2016. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 220-240.
    5. Armenter, Roc, 2013. "The perils of nominal targets," Working Papers 14-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 04 Feb 2014.
    6. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    7. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    8. Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, . "Gradualism and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Holden, Thomas, 2016. "Existence and uniqueness of solutions to dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints," EconStor Preprints 130142, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    10. Andrea Ajello & Thomas Laubach & J. David Lopez-Salido & Taisuke Nakata, 2016. "Financial Stability and Optimal Interest-Rate Policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-067, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Sanjay R. Singh, 2016. "Log-linear Approximation versus an Exact Solution at the ZLB in the New Keynesian Model," NBER Working Papers 22784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Schmidt, Sebastian, 2018. "Time-consistent monetary policy, terms of trade manipulation and welfare in open economies," Working Paper Series 2128, European Central Bank.
    13. Charles Evans & Jonas Fisher & Francois Gourio & Spencer Krane, 2015. "Risk Management for Monetary Policy Near the Zero Lower Bound," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 46(1 (Spring), pages 141-219.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deflationary Bias; Inflation Conservatism; Inflation Targeting; Liquidity Traps; Zero Lower Bound;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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