A Model for Team Managers with Self-serving Workers
We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers' abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers' true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in the absence of asymmetry of information.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unav.edu/web/facultad-de-ciencias-economicas-y-empresariales|
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- Corgnet, Brice, 2005. "Team formation and biased self-attribution," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb055214, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
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