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A Model for Team Managers with Self-serving Workers

  • Brice Corgnet

    ()

    (Universidad de Navarra)

We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers' abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers' true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in the absence of asymmetry of information.

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File URL: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom/files/workingpapersmodule/@random45ab5988c3bf2/1188465773_WP2_Brice.pdf
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Paper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number 08/07.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp0807
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom

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  1. Brice Corgnet, 2005. "Team Formation And Biased Self-Attribution," Business Economics Working Papers wb055214, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
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