IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ulp/sbbeta/2016-29.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Efficiency of (strict) Liability Rules revised in Risk and Ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Lampach
  • Sandrine Spaeter

Abstract

In this paper we revise the results about the efficiency of (strict) unlimited, then limited liability in inducing optimal investment in prevention by injurers. Risk and ambiguity are considered. We assume that the potential injurer whose activities cause a risk of environmental accident can reduce the probability of accident by investing in prevention. In the risky model, we recover that limited liability does not always induce low prevention. Contrary to the arguments enhanced by Beard (1990) and Lipowski-Posey (1993), outside lending, absent from our model, does not explain this result. In the ambiguous context, we implement the Non-Extreme Outcome (NEO) expected utility model (Chateauneuf et al., 2007) to represent the injurer’s beliefs and decisions. When ambiguity matters and prevention also affects the injurer’s subjective beliefs, none of the results with risk hold. In particular, the injurer can overinvest in prevention under both unlimited and limited liability.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Lampach & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "The Efficiency of (strict) Liability Rules revised in Risk and Ambiguity," Working Papers of BETA 2016-29, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2016-29
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/productions/publications/2016/2016-29.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & De Geest, Gerrit, 2006. "When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 336-354, September.
    2. Wakker, Peter P, 2001. "Testing and Characterizing Properties of Nonadditive Measures through Violations of the Sure-Thing Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1039-1059, July.
    3. Aylit Tina Romm, 2014. "An interpretation of focal point responses as non-additive beliefs," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 9(5), pages 387-402, September.
    4. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7604 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Frank Müller-Langer, 2009. "Strict Liability versus Negligence," Chapters, in: Michael Faure (ed.), Tort Law and Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Chateauneuf, Alain & Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon, 2007. "Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 538-567, November.
    8. Nehring, Klaus, 1999. "Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 197-213, September.
    9. Johanna Etner & Meglena Jeleva & Jean‐Marc Tallon, 2012. "Decision Theory Under Ambiguity," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 234-270, April.
    10. Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003. "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May.
    11. Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2003. "A note on optimal care by wealth-constrained injurers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 273-284, September.
    12. Manning, Richard L, 1994. "Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 247-275, April.
    13. Julien Jacob & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Large-Scale Risks and Technological Change: What About Limited Liability?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 125-142, February.
    14. Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2007. "A Unilateral Accident Model under Ambiguity," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 431-477, June.
    15. Camerer, Colin & Weber, Martin, 1992. "Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 325-370, October.
    16. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1987. "Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 65-88, February.
    17. Gérard Mondello, 2013. "Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories"," Post-Print halshs-00929948, HAL.
    18. Larry G. Epstein, 1999. "A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 579-608.
    19. Adam Dominiak & Jean-Philippe Lefort, 2013. "Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 1-13, January.
    20. repec:bla:jpbect:v:19:y:2017:i:1:p:97-120 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Daniel Ellsberg, 1961. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 643-669.
    22. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, 2005. "Judgment Proofness under Four Different Precaution Technologies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(1), pages 38-56, March.
    23. Epstein, Larry G & Zhang, Jiankang, 2001. "Subjective Probabilities on Subjectively Unambiguous Events," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 265-306, March.
    24. Barham, Bradford L. & Chavas, Jean-Paul & Fitz, Dylan & Salas, Vanessa Ríos & Schechter, Laura, 2014. "The roles of risk and ambiguity in technology adoption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 204-218.
    25. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    26. Posey, Lisa Lipowski, 1993. "Limited liability and incentives when firms can inflict damages greater than net worth," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 325-330, September.
    27. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
    28. Pitchford, Rohan, 1995. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1171-1186, December.
    29. Johanna Etner & Meglena Jeleva & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2012. "Decision theory under ambiguity," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00643580, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gérard Mondello, 2017. "Un modèle d'accident unilatéral: incertitude non-radicale et estimations différenciées," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-12, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    2. Nicolas Lampach & Kene Boun My & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Risk, Ambiguity and Efficient Liability Rules: An experiment," Working Papers of BETA 2016-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. Gérard Mondello, 2016. "The Negligence Rule Specificity under Radical Uncertainty," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-32, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strict liability; Ambiguity; Optimal Care; Optimism; Subjective Beliefs.;

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D29 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Other

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2016-29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/bestrfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.