IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gre/wpaper/2017-12.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Un modèle d'accident unilatéral: incertitude non-radicale et estimations différenciées

Author

Listed:
  • Gérard Mondello

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

Abstract

Cet article reconsidère le modèle d'accident unilatéral standard en univers probabiliste (hors incertitude radicale). Contrairement à ce dernier, les agents (porteur de préjudice et victime) forment des estimations différentes sur la distribution de probabilité d’accident et l'évaluation des dommages. En conséquence, le coût social d'un accident varie suivant le type de responsabilité civile (invariable dans le modèle standard). La correspondance entre les régimes de la responsabilité sans faute et la règle de la négligence n'existe plus sauf dans l’hypothèse où le pollueur estime les coûts des dommages à un niveau supérieur à celui de la victime.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Mondello, 2017. "Un modèle d'accident unilatéral: incertitude non-radicale et estimations différenciées," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-12, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2017-12
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://195.220.198.217/GREDEG-WP-2017-12.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2017
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter.
    2. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2002. "Economic analysis of law," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1661-1784, Elsevier.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. Gérard Mondello, 2012. "The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A « Trompe l'œil » Perspective," Working Papers 2012.08, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Camerer, Colin & Weber, Martin, 1992. "Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 325-370, October.
    6. Steven Shavell, 1982. "On Liability and Insurance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 120-132, Spring.
    7. Chateauneuf, Alain & Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon, 2007. "Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 538-567, November.
    8. Nicolas Lampach & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "The Efficiency of (strict) Liability Rules revised in Risk and Ambiguity," Working Papers of BETA 2016-29, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    9. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    10. Guiseppe Dari Mattiaci & F. Parisi, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
    11. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249.
    12. Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2007. "A Unilateral Accident Model under Ambiguity," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 431-477, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gérard Mondello, 2012. "The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A " Trompe l'œil " Perspective," Post-Print hal-00727223, HAL.
    2. Gérard Mondello, 2013. "Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories"," Post-Print halshs-00929948, HAL.
    3. Gérard Mondello, 2016. "The Negligence Rule Specificity under Radical Uncertainty," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-32, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    4. Gérard Mondello, 2015. "Civil liability, Knight's UnCertainty and non-diCtatorial regUlator Documents de travail GREDEG GREDEG Working Papers Series," Working Papers hal-01251437, HAL.
    5. Gérard Mondello, 2022. "A General Accident Model for Risky Activities," GREDEG Working Papers 2022-12, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Apr 2023.
    6. Mondello, Gérard, 2012. "La responsabilité environnementale des prêteurs : difficultés juridiques et ensemble des possibles," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 88(2), pages 257-278, Juin.
    7. Gérard Mondello, 2020. "Strict Liability vs Negligence: Is Economic Efficiency a Relevant Comparison Criterion?," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-18, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    8. Nicolas Lampach & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "The Efficiency of (strict) Liability Rules revised in Risk and Ambiguity," Working Papers of BETA 2016-29, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    9. Nicolas Lampach & Kene Boun My & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Risk, Ambiguity and Efficient Liability Rules: An experiment," Working Papers of BETA 2016-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    10. Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2016. "Tort law under oligopolistic competition," Sciences Po publications 2016-29, Sciences Po.
    11. L. A. Franzoni, 2016. "Optimal liability design under risk and ambiguity," Working Papers wp1048, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5a1unjmoh881mrfbrlqhebkbba is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2018. "The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly," Working Papers hal-03458358, HAL.
    14. David Meintrup & Chang Woon Nam, 2009. "Shadow Market Area for Air Pollutants," Environment and Planning B, , vol. 36(4), pages 664-681, August.
    15. Gérard Mondello, 2015. "Civil Liability, Knight’s Uncertainty and Non-Dictatorial Regulator," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-47, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    16. Bartsch, Elga, 1997. "Environmental liability, imperfect information, and multidimensional pollution control," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 139-146, March.
    17. Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents," MPRA Paper 25710, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Intriligator, Michael D. & Sheshinski, Eytan & Slutsky, Steven M., 2006. "Private information, Coasian bargaining, and the second welfare theorem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 871-895, May.
    19. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1jki13i7298a9knanhskpugh3 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 2022. "Efficient liability law when parties genuinely disagree," Working Papers wp1176, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    21. Steven Shavell, 2011. "Corrective Taxation versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 249-266.
    22. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    accident unilateral; responsabilité civile; ambiguïté; responsabilité objective; responsabilité subjective;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2017-12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patrice Bougette (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/credcfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.