Private information, Coasian bargaining, and the second welfare theorem
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- Joseph Farrell., 1987.
"Information and the Coase Theorem,"
Economics Working Papers
8747, University of California at Berkeley.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H & Slutsky, Steven, 2000. " Decentralizing Allocation and Distribution by Separation with Information Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 289-318.
- Brito, Dagobert L. & Intriligator, Michael D. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1997. "Privatization and the distribution of income in the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 181-205, May.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H & Sheshinski, Eytan & Slutsky, Steven M, 1989. "Production Externalities and Long-run Equilibria: Bargaining and Pigovian Taxation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(3), pages 453-71, July.
- Efraim Sadka, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 261-267.
- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991.
"Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation,"
828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 463-78, August.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2000.
"Incentives and Political Economy,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780198294245, December.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982.
"Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation,"
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Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
- Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, 2001. "Second-Best Pollution Taxes and the Structure of Preferences," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 258-280, October.
- Frech, H E, III, 1979. "The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium: The Nonequivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rights," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(2), pages 254-68, April.
- Baumol, William J & Bradford, David F, 1972. "Detrimental Externalities and Non-Convexity of the Production Set," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 39(154), pages 160-76, May.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, December.
- Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
- Hurwicz, Leonid, 1999. " Revisiting Externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 225-45.
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