Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-Additive Probabilities
Acts are functions from the set of states of the world into the set of consequences. Savage proposed axioms regarding a binary relation on the set of acts which are necessary and sufficient for it to be representable by the functional ʃu(*)dP for some real-valued (utility) function u on the set of consequences and a (probability) measure P on the set of states of the world. The Ellsberg paradox leads us to reject one of Savage's main axioms - the Sure Thing Principle - and develop a more general theory, in which the probability measure need not be additive.
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|Date of creation:||1987|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 1987, vol. 16, pp. 65-88. <10.1016/0304-4068(87)90022-X>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00756291|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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