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Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans

  • Rubén Poblete-Cazenave
  • Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

We address a general equilibrium model with limited-recourse collateralized loans. Borrowers are burden to constitute physical collateral guarantees, which are repossessed in case of default and delivered to the associated lenders. In addition, lenders may receive payments over collateral values, since debtor's wealth (physical and financial) can be garnished when commitments are not fully honored. The reimbursement of resources is proportional to the size of claims.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/01888b8058451586610ac4b23c3c7b6b101e1eaa.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number wp313.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp313
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/
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  1. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2001. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1304R5, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2004.
  2. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Vailakis, Y., 2011. "Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 719, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  3. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2008. "Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 670, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  4. Magill,Michael & Quinzii,Martine, 1992. "Infinite horizon,Incomplete markets," Discussion Paper Serie A 384, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Steinert, Mariano & Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo, 2007. "General equilibrium in CLO markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 709-734, August.
  6. Páscoa, Mario Rui & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Barbachan, José Fajardo, 2003. "Endogenous Collateral," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 511, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  7. Aloisio Ara�jo & Jaime Orrillo & Mario R. Páscoa, 2000. "Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21.
  8. Balder, Erik J., 1999. "On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 207-223, October.
  9. Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2012. "Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 277-282.
  10. Álvaro Riascos Villegas & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2010. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Large Generalized Games with Atomic Players," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 007091, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  11. Hernandez D., Alejandro & Santos, Manuel S., 1996. "Competitive Equilibria for Infinite-Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 102-130, October.
  12. Myrian Petrassi & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2007. "Collateralized Assets And Asymmetric Information," Textos para discussão 539, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  13. Monique Florenzano & Pascal Gourdel, 1996. "Incomplete Markets In Infinite Horizon: Debt Constraints Versus Node Prices," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 167-196.
  14. Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993. "Debt Constrained Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1276, David K. Levine.
  15. Zame, William R, 1993. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets Are Incomplete," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1142-64, December.
  16. Abdelkrim Seghir & Juan Torres-Martínez, 2008. "Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 471-502, September.
  17. Weerachart Kilenthong, 2011. "Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 475-501, April.
  18. Sabarwal Tarun, 2003. "Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-42, January.
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