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Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans

  • Rubén Poblete-Cazenave
  • Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

We address a general equilibrium model with limited-recourse collateralized loans. Borrowers are burden to constitute physical collateral guarantees, which are repossessed in case of default and delivered to the associated lenders. In addition, lenders may receive payments over collateral values, since debtor's wealth (physical and financial) can be garnished when commitments are not fully honored. The reimbursement of resources is proportional to the size of claims.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/01888b8058451586610ac4b23c3c7b6b101e1eaa.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number wp313.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp313
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/

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  1. Magill,Michael & Quinzii,Martine, 1992. "Infinite horizon,Incomplete markets," Discussion Paper Serie A 384, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2005. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 1-37, 01.
  3. Weerachart Kilenthong, 2011. "Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 475-501, April.
  4. Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2012. "Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 277-282.
  5. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2008. "Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 670, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  6. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Vailakis, Y., 2011. "Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 719, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  7. William R. Zame, 1992. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are Incomplete," UCLA Economics Working Papers 673, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Aloisio Ara�jo & Jaime Orrillo & Mario R. Páscoa, 2000. "Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21.
  9. Myrian Petrassi & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2007. "Collateralized Assets And Asymmetric Information," Textos para discussão 539, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  10. Monique Florenzano & Pascal Gourdel, 1996. "Incomplete Markets In Infinite Horizon: Debt Constraints Versus Node Prices," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 167-196.
  11. Steinert, Mariano & Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo, 2007. "General equilibrium in CLO markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 709-734, August.
  12. Balder, Erik J., 1999. "On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 207-223, October.
  13. Mário Páscoa & Aloisio Araujo & José Fajardo, 2004. "Endogenous Collateral," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 161, Econometric Society.
  14. Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 865-88, October.
  15. Abdelkrim Seghir & Juan Torres-Martínez, 2008. "Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 471-502, September.
  16. Sabarwal Tarun, 2003. "Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-42, January.
  17. Hernandez D., Alejandro & Santos, Manuel S., 1996. "Competitive Equilibria for Infinite-Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 102-130, October.
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