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In nitely-lived agents via two-sided altruism

  • Seghir, Abdelkrim
  • Salem, Sherif

In an incomplete market with two sided altruistic agents and default.We show equilibrium existence if members of a dynasty act in an individualistic way by maximizing their own intergenerational utility functions. We also illustrate that a dynasty may end doing Ponzi schemes if its members act in a collectivistic way by maximizing a dynasty's collectivistic utility. We also prove that Ponzi schemes are ruled out and equilibrium existence is restored if there exist, always in the future, some agents who are not too altruistic either towards their parents or their ospring.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31828/1/MPRA_paper_31828.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31379.

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Date of creation: 21 Sep 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31379
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  2. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2005. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 1-37, 01.
  3. Monique Florenzano & Pascal Gourdel, 1996. "Incomplete Markets In Infinite Horizon: Debt Constraints Versus Node Prices," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 167-196.
  4. Abdelkrim SEGHIR, 2006. "Overlapping Generations Model with Incomplete Markets: The Numeraire Case II," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 81, pages 113-139.
  5. W. G. Gale & J. K. Scholz, . "Intergenerational transfers and the accumulation of wealth," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1019-93, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
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  7. Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614 Elsevier.
  8. Florenzano, Monique & Gourdel, Pascal & Pascoa, Mario Rui, 2001. "Overlapping generations models with incomplete markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 201-218, December.
  9. Páscoa, Mário Rui & Seghir, Abdelkrim, 2009. "Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 270-286, January.
  10. Abdelkrim Seghir & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2006. "Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain," Textos para discussão 527, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  11. Stéphane Lambrecht & Philippe Michel & Emmanuel Thibault, 2006. "Capital Accumulation and Fiscal Policy in an OLG Model with Family Altruism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(3), pages 465-486, 08.
  12. Arrondel, Luc & Laferrere, Anne, 2001. "Taxation and wealth transmission in France," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 3-33, January.
  13. Steinert, Mariano & Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo, 2007. "General equilibrium in CLO markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 709-734, August.
  14. Michel, Philippe & Thibault, Emmanuel, 2007. "The failure of Ricardian equivalence under dynastic altruism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 606-614, June.
  15. Magill, M. & Quinzii, M., 1993. "Icomplete Markets Over an Infinite Horizon: Long-Lived Securities and Speculative Bubbles," Papers 9321, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  16. Luisa Fuster, 2000. "Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Dynasties and Uncertain Lifetimes," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 650-674, October.
  17. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1999. " Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 71-100.
  18. Hernandez D., Alejandro & Santos, Manuel S., 1996. "Competitive Equilibria for Infinite-Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 102-130, October.
  19. Páscoa, Mario Rui & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2001. "Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 419, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
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