IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article

Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans

  • Rubén Poblete-Cazenave

    ()

  • Juan Torres-Martínez

    ()

We address a general equilibrium model with limited-recourse collateralized loans and securitization of debts. Each borrower is required to pledge physical collateral, and bankruptcy is filed against him if claims are not fully honored. Moreover, agents have a positive amount of wealth exempt from garnishment and, for at least a fraction of them, commodities used as collateral are desirable. In this context, equilibrium exists for any continuous garnishment rule and multiple types of reimbursement mechanisms. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-011-0685-8
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 53 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 181-211

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:1:p:181-211
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: http://saet.uiowa.edu/

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Alvaro Riascos V. & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2010. "A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games with atomic players," Working Papers wp311, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  2. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2008. "Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 670, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  3. Magill, M. & Quinzii, M., 1992. "Infinite Horizon Incomplete Markets," Papers 413a, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  4. Weerachart Kilenthong, 2011. "Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(3), pages 475-501, April.
  5. Florenzano, M. & Gourdel, P., 1994. "Incomplete Markets in Infinite Horizon: Debt Constraints Versus Node Prices," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 94.76, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  6. William R. Zame, 1992. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are Incomplete," UCLA Economics Working Papers 673, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Mário Páscoa & Aloisio Araujo & José Fajardo, 2004. "Endogenous Collateral," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 161, Econometric Society.
  8. Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993. "Debt Constrained Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1276, David K. Levine.
  9. Aloisio Araújo & Jaime Orrillo & Mario R. Páscoa, 2000. "Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21.
  10. Myrian Petrassi & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2007. "Collateralized Assets And Asymmetric Information," Textos para discussão 539, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  11. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2005. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 1-37, 01.
  12. Sabarwal Tarun, 2003. "Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-42, January.
  13. Abdelkrim Seghir & Juan Torres-Martínez, 2008. "Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 471-502, September.
  14. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2011. "Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 719, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  15. Balder, Erik J., 1999. "On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 207-223, October.
  16. Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2012. "Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 277-282.
  17. Hernandez D., Alejandro & Santos, Manuel S., 1996. "Competitive Equilibria for Infinite-Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 102-130, October.
  18. Steinert, Mariano & Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo, 2007. "General equilibrium in CLO markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 709-734, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:1:p:181-211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Rebekah McClure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.