Optimal Progressive Income Taxation in a Bewley-Grossman Framework
We study the optimal progressivity of income taxation in a Bewley-Grossman model of health capital accumulation where individuals are exposed to earnings and health risks over the lifecycle. We impose the U.S. tax and transfer system and calibrate the model to match U.S. data. We then optimize the progressivity of the income tax code. The optimal income tax system is more progressive than current U.S. income taxes with zero taxes at the lower end of the income distribution and a marginal tax rate of over 50 percent for income earners above US$ 200,000. The Suits indexâ€”a Gini coefficient for the income tax contribution by incomeâ€”is around 0.53 and much higher than 0.17 in the U.S. benchmark tax system. Welfare gains from switching to the optimal tax system amount to over 5 percent of compensating consumption. Moreover, we find that the structure of the health insurance system affects the degree of optimal progressivity of the income tax system. The introduction of Affordable Care Act in 2010â€”a program that redistributes wealth from high income and healthy types, to low income and sicker typesâ€”reduces the optimal progressivity level of the income tax system. Finally, we demonstrate that the optimal tax system is sensitive to the parametric specification of the income tax function and the transfer policy.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2017|
|Date of revision:||Mar 2017|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Towson, Maryland 21252-0001|
Web page: http://www.towson.edu/cbe/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Capatina, Elena, 2015. "Life-cycle effects of health risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 67-88.
- Mark Huggett & Juan Carlos Parra, 2010.
"How Well Does the U.S. Social Insurance System Provide Social Insurance?,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(1), pages 76-112, 02.
- Mark Huggett & Juan Carols Parra, 2006. "How Well Does the US Social Insurance System Provide Social Insurance?," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-11, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Yogo, Motohiro, 2016. "Portfolio choice in retirement: Health risk and the demand for annuities, housing, and risky assets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 17-34.
- Motohiro Yogo, 2008. "Portfolio Choice in Retirement: Health Risk and the Demand for Annuities, Housing, and Risky Assets," 2008 Meeting Papers 63, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Motohiro Yogo, 2009. "Portfolio Choice in Retirement: Health Risk and the Demand for Annuities, Housing and Risky Assets," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2009-3, Center for Retirement Research, revised Jan 2009.
- Motohiro Yogo, 2009. "Portfolio Choice in Retirement: Health Risk and the Demand for Annuities, Housing, and Risky Assets," NBER Working Papers 15307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krueger, Dirk & Ludwig, Alexander, 2016. "On the optimal provision of social insurance: Progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 72-98.
- Dirk Krueger & Alexander Ludwig, 2015. "On the Optimal Provision of Social Insurance: Progressive Taxation versus Education Subsidies in General Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 21538, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krueger, Dirk & Ludwig, Alexander, 2015. "On the Optimal Provision of Social Insurance: Progressive Taxation versus Education Subsidies in General Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10806, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stefanie Stantcheva, 2015. "Optimal Taxation and Human Capital Policies over the Life Cycle," NBER Working Papers 21207, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dahlia K. Remler & Jason E. Rachlin & Sherry A. Glied, 2001. "What can the take-up of other programs teach us about how to improve take-up of health insurance programs?," NBER Working Papers 8185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tow:wpaper:2017-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Juergen Jung)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.