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Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data

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  • Abbring, J.H.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Chiappori, P.A.
  • Zavadil, T.

Abstract

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives to avoid claims that are generated by the Dutch experience-rating scheme, and their effects on claim times and sizes under moral hazard. We develop tests that exploit these structural implications of moral hazard and experience rating. Unlike much of the earlier literature, we find evidence of moral hazard.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Abbring, J.H. & Chiappori, P.A. & Zavadil, T., 2008. "Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data," Discussion Paper 2008-77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:8c8b013c-a0d4-4bf8-b109-a94e9858535c
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
    2. Jaap H. Abbring & James J. Heckman & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard In Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 512-521, 04/05.
    3. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chris Robinson & Bingyong Zheng, 2010. "Moral hazard, insurance claims, and repeated insurance contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 967-993, August.
    2. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    3. Georges Dionne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Maki Dahchour, 2013. "Separating Moral Hazard From Adverse Selection And Learning In Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence From France," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 897-917, August.
    4. Okura Mahito & Yoshizawa Takuya & Sakaki Motohiro, 2021. "An Evaluation of the New Japanese Bonus–Malus System with No-claim and Claimed Subclasses," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-12, January.
    5. Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2012. "Moral hazard and selection among the poor: Evidence from a randomized experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 72-85.
    6. Lewbel, Arthur & Lu, Xun & Su, Liangjun, 2015. "Specification testing for transformation models with an application to generalized accelerated failure-time models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 184(1), pages 81-96.
    7. Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.
    8. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
    9. Xiaoqi Zhang & Yi Chen & Yi Yao, 2021. "Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 468-507, July.
    10. Hu, Yingyao & Shum, Matthew, 2012. "Nonparametric identification of dynamic models with unobserved state variables," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 171(1), pages 32-44.
    11. repec:ipf:psejou:v:42:y:2018:i:42:p:45-65 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2011. "Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1137, CIRPEE.
    13. Pavel A. Yakovlev & Christina M. Orr-Magulick, 2018. "On the road again: traffic fatalities and auto insurance minimums," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 42(1), pages 45-65.
    14. Spenkch, Jörg L., 2011. "Adverse selection and moral hazard among the poor: evidence from a randomized experiment," MPRA Paper 31443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Przemysław Jeziorski & Elena Krasnokutskaya & Olivia Ceccarini, 2019. "Skimming from the Bottom: Empirical Evidence of Adverse Selection When Poaching Customers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 543-566, July.
    16. Jaap H. Abbring, 2010. "Identification of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 367-394, September.
    17. Hu, Yingyao, 2017. "The Econometrics of Unobservables -- Latent Variable and Measurement Error Models and Their Applications in Empirical Industrial Organization and Labor Economics [The Econometrics of Unobservables]," Economics Working Paper Archive 64578, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised 2021.
    18. Levon Barseghyan & Jeffrey Prince & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2011. "Are Risk Preferences Stable across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 591-631, April.
    19. McBain, Florence, 2014. "Health insurance and health environment: India’s subsidized health insurance in a context of limited water and sanitation services," Working Papers 179200, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    20. Michael Ludkovski & Virginia R. Young, 2010. "Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 829-856, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    insurance; moral hazard; selection; state dependence; event-history analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General

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