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Flow Variability and Data Sharing in Transboundary River Treaties

Author

Listed:
  • Erik Ansink

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • Jens Gudmundsson

    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Harold Houba

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Abstract

Treaties on transboundary river sharing often include provisions for sharing hydrologic data, yet such sharing is often limited where hydrologic variability is high. We study this puzzle in a model where treaty obligations must be conditioned on a noisy but verifiable public signal of inflows, and improving its accuracy is costly. We find that greater variability reduces the value of signal accuracy under concave benefits. When investments in accuracy are part of a negotiated treaty, the effect of variability on negotiated signal accuracy can be non-monotonic. Using treaty-text codings matched to basin-level variability measures, we provide descriptive evidence that basins with more variable river flow tend to feature weaker data-sharing provisions. The findings highlight a constraint on treaty design: when treaties can condition only on noisy but verifiable information, higher variability need not lead to stronger data sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Ansink & Jens Gudmundsson & Harold Houba, 2026. "Flow Variability and Data Sharing in Transboundary River Treaties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 26-043/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260043
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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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