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Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Jonneke Bolhaar

    (VU University Amsterdam, and CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Research, the Netherlands)

  • Nadine Ketel

    (University of Gothenburg, Sweden)

  • Bas van der Klaauw

    (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

Abstract

This paper studies mandatory job-search periods for welfare applicants. During this period the benefits application is put on hold and the applicant is obliged to make job applications. We combine a randomized experiment with detailed administrative data to investigate the effects of imposing a job-search period. We find strong and persistent effects on the probability to collect welfare benefits. The reduced benefits are fully compensated by increased earnings from work. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of adverse consequences for the most vulnerable applicants. Our results therefore suggest that a job-search period is an effective instrument for targeting welfare-benefits applicants.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonneke Bolhaar & Nadine Ketel & Bas van der Klaauw, 2016. "Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-013/V, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe & Andrey Launov & Bruno Van der Linden, 2018. "Imperfect Monitoring of Job Search: Structural Estimation and Policy Design," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 75-120.
    2. Schiprowski, Amelie, 2017. "The Role of Caseworkers in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence from Unplanned Absences," IZA Discussion Papers 11040, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Egbert Jongen & Emile Cammeraat & Pierre Koning, 2017. "Preventing NEETs During the Great Recession: The Effects of a Mandatory Activation Program for Young Welfare Recipients," CPB Discussion Paper 365, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    4. Lucy Kok & Caren Tempelman & Pierre Koning & Lennart Kroon & Caroline Berden, 2017. "Do Incentives for Municipalities Reduce the Welfare Caseload? Evaluation of a Welfare Reform in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 23-42, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    job search; welfare-to-work; active labor-market policies; randomized experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies

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