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Teacher incentives in South Africa: a theoretical investigation of the possibilities

Author

Listed:
  • Paula Armstrong

    (Department of Economics, University of Stellenbosch)

Abstract

This paper investigates different theoretical models of incentives for teachers in education. It highlights key characteristics likely to render incentives successful in encouraging productive behaviour, provides evidence of where these systems have been successfully and unsuccessfully implemented internationally and the likelihood of successful implementation of teacher incentive programmes in South Africa.

Suggested Citation

  • Paula Armstrong, 2014. "Teacher incentives in South Africa: a theoretical investigation of the possibilities," Working Papers 07/2014, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sza:wpaper:wpapers212
    as

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    File URL: https://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2014/wp072014/wp-07-2014.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George Baker, 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 728-751.
    2. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June.
    3. Clotfelter, Charles T. & Ladd, Helen F. & Vigdor, Jacob, 2005. "Who teaches whom? Race and the distribution of novice teachers," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 377-392, August.
    4. Barbara Bruns & David Evans & Javier Luque, 2012. "Achieving World-Class Education in Brazil : The Next Agenda," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2383, December.
    5. Barbara Bruns & Deon Filmer & Harry Anthony Patrinos, 2011. "Making Schools Work : New Evidence on Accountability Reforms," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2270, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentives; teachers;

    JEL classification:

    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining

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