Commercial platforms with heterogeneous participants
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Other versions of this item:
- Gabriel Garber & Márcio Issao Nakane, 2016. "Commercial Platforms With Heterogeneous Participants," Working Papers Series 417, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ettore Damiano & Li Hao, 2008. "Competing Matchmaking," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 789-818, June.
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More about this item
KeywordsPlatforms; two-sided markets; heterogeneous agents; certification.;
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-02-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2016-02-12 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2016-02-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2016-02-12 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2016-02-12 (Network Economics)
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