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The mainstream economics interpretation of the local state and central-local relations in Post-Mao China: a critical review

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  • Alexandre De Podestá Gomes

    (Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, UK)

Abstract

Decentralization and the role of local governments have long been touted as key factors in the Chinese economic miracle. This paper intends to critically assess the chief theories advanced by mainstream economics in its attempt to make sense of these aspects of Chinaís growth story. Firstly the theoretical underpinnings of fiscal federalism, new institutional economics, and market-preserving federalism approaches will be presented, as these theories offer the bedrock for most of the applied insights in which China is framed through the lenses of the central-local relations debate. Secondly, the idea of ëmarket-preserving federalism, Chinese-styleí will be critically appraised, highlighting its shortcomings. Thirdly, the paper proceeds by bringing in the mainstream response to these problems, relying on the notion of political incentives and career concerns faced by local cadres. It will be argued that the continual adherence to some core tenets dear to the new institutional economics literature in all previous explanations prevents this broad camp of knowledge to properly grasp the complex dynamics of Chinaís decentralization drive and the role of local governments in the process. Finally, and in closing, an alternative approach will be offered.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandre De Podestá Gomes, 2018. "The mainstream economics interpretation of the local state and central-local relations in Post-Mao China: a critical review," Working Papers 214, Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, UK.
  • Handle: RePEc:soa:wpaper:214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentralization; Central-local relations; local state; federalism; political incentives; career concerns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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