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Does economic governance matter? New contributions to the debate

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  • Ugur, Mehmet
  • Sunderland, David

Abstract

Economic governance institutions (rules, norms and enforcement practices) define the cost and incentive structures that influence the decisions of economic actors. They therefore have a significant impact on micro and macro economic performance across countries and time. This introductory chapter examines the theoretical and empirical contributions to the debate and elaborates on the contributions of the studies included in the edited book.

Suggested Citation

  • Ugur, Mehmet & Sunderland, David, 2011. "Does economic governance matter? New contributions to the debate," Greenwich Papers in Political Economy 6959, University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre.
  • Handle: RePEc:gpe:wpaper:6959
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    References listed on IDEAS

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