The Case of the Errant Executive : Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating
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- Brishti Guha, 2005. "The Case of the Errant Executive : Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating," Microeconomics Working Papers 22428, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
Moral hazard; firm size; managerial compensation; repeated games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-SEA-2006-09-30 (South East Asia)
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