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Public Trading and Private Incentives

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  • Denis Gromb

Abstract

This paper studies the link between public trading and the activity of a firms large shareholder who can affect firm value. Public trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholders activity. This increases the latters incentives to engage in value increasing activities. Indeed, if he has to liquidate part of his stake before the effect of his activity is publicly observed, a more informative price rewards him for his activity. Implications of this perspective are derived for the decision to go public and security design.

Suggested Citation

  • Denis Gromb, 2000. "Public Trading and Private Incentives," FMG Discussion Papers dp347, Financial Markets Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp347
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    Cited by:

    1. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, 2009. "The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2445-2485, July.
    2. Brishti Guha, 2005. "The Case of the Errant Executive : Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating," Microeconomics Working Papers 22428, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    3. Chemla, Gilles & de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne, 2003. "Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent," CEPR Discussion Papers 4139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Earnings Manipilation and Incentives in Firms," Working Papers w0055, New Economic School (NES), revised Oct 2005.
    5. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    6. Daniel Ferreira & Gustavo Manso & André C. Silva, 2014. "Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to Go Public or Private," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(1), pages 256-300, January.
    7. Sabri Boubaker & Hind Sami, 2011. "Multiple large shareholders and earnings informativeness," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 10(3), pages 246-266, August.
    8. Alex Edmans & Vivian W. Fang & Emanuel Zur, 2013. "The Effect of Liquidity on Governance," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(6), pages 1443-1482.
    9. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2009. "The Role of Financial Intermediaries in Securities Issues: A Theoretical Analysis," MPRA Paper 16112, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Ferreira, Daniel & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Raposo, Clara C., 2008. "Board Structure and Price Informativeness," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-4, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Philip Bond & Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein, 2012. "The Real Effects of Financial Markets," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 339-360, October.
    12. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher, 2011. "Privately versus Publicly Optimal Skin in the Game: Optimal Mechanism and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 8403, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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