Network regulation using an agent
The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2007|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2007|
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