Asset Returns and Financial Fragility
What configuration of asset returns will make the banking system most susceptible to a self-fulfilling run? I study this question in a version of the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with limited commitment and a non-trivial portfolio choice. I show that the relationship between the returns on banks’ assets and financial fragility is often non-monotone: a higher return may make banks either more or less susceptible to a run by depositors. The same is true for changes in the liquidation cost and the term premium. I derive precise conditions under which changes in each of these returns increase or decrease financial fragility.
|Date of creation:||15 Feb 2016|
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- repec:chb:bcchsb:v24c06pp151-233 is not listed on IDEAS
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