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Optimal Diamond–Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty

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  • Sultanum, Bruno

Abstract

This paper characterizes the direct mechanism which implements the constrained optimal outcome in a version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with aggregate uncertainty and a continuum of agents. Using this result, numerical examples where the best direct mechanism has a bank-run-equilibrium are easily obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Sultanum, Bruno, 2014. "Optimal Diamond–Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 95-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:95-102
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2013.12.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Green, Edward J. & Lin, Ping, 2003. "Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2009. "Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1996-2020, September.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    4. Cavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira & Bertolai, Jefferson Donizeti Pereira & Monteiro, P. K., 2011. "A note on convergence of Peck-Shell and Green-Lin mechanisms in the Diamond-Dybvig model," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 722, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    5. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Huberto Ennis & Todd Keister, 2016. "Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 335-363, February.
    2. Keister, Todd & Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2023. "Allocating losses: Bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    3. Li, Yang, 2017. "Interest rates and financial fragility," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 195-205.
    4. Todd Keister & Vijay Narasiman, 2016. "Expectations vs. Fundamentals- driven Bank Runs: When Should Bailouts be Permitted?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 89-104, July.
    5. Gergely Horváth & Hubert János Kiss, 2016. "Correlated Observations, the Law of Small Numbers and Bank Runs," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(4), pages 1-29, April.
    6. Bruno Sultanum, 2016. "Nonparametric Estimation of the Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Q4, pages 261-279.
    7. Bucher, Monika & Dietrich, Diemo & Tvede, Mich, 2018. "Coordination failures, bank runs and asset prices," Discussion Papers 39/2018, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    8. Simas Kucinskas, 2015. "Liquidity Creation without Banks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-101/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Simas Kucinskas, 2015. "Liquidity creation without banks," DNB Working Papers 482, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    10. Kučinskas, Simas, 2019. "Aggregate risk and efficiency of mutual funds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 1-11.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Diamond–Dybvig model; Bank-run; Deposit contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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