Does The Stock Market Punish Corporate Malfeasance? A Case Study of Citigroup
This paper examines how well the market anticipates regulatory sanction. We look at key dates of SEC, NASD, FTC, Congressional and foreign investigations and their subsequent resolution. Our event study confirms that the settlements provide little new information to the market. In six major case groupings, we find highly accurate predictions from market capitalization changes of settlements and associated private litigation.
|Date of creation:||09 Jan 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Corporate Ownership and Control 4:3, 2006, 154-8.|
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- Paul A. Griffin & Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, 2004. "Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: An Analysis of Sequential and Conditional Information," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 40(1), pages 21-48.
- Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1999. "On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 527-73, April.
- David W. Prince & Paul H. Rubin, 2002. "The Effects of Product Liability Litigation on the Value of Firms," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 44-87, January.
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