Enumerating Rights: More is Not Always Better
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsConstitutional Design; Coase Theorem; Framing; Preferences; Rights; Battle of the Sexes;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2019-08-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2019-08-12 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2019-08-12 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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