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Motivazioni, Procedure e Filtri: strumenti innovativi di sviluppo organizzativo

  • Pelligra, Vittorio

    ()

    (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

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    The paper discusses the theoretical foundations of an incentive provision system based both on material and immaterial (moral and social) incentives. We focus on the normative implications streaming from an enlargement of the idea of rationality traditionally applied to the analysis of strategic choices: when self-interest, in fact, is supplemented with behavioral principles such as reciprocity, trust, altruism and intrinsic motivation, the way incentives have to be designed and provided should change consequently. We first describe the functioning of such principles and then analyze in some depth the way those factors can be used to favor an efficient matching between principal and agents endowed with functional preferences in presence of asymmetric information. Such an efficient matching produces positive effects on the effort provided by agents which, in turn, positively affects organizational efficiency. This process applies with particular cogence to economic environments characterized by vocational workers (civil economy), where intrinsic motivations are a crucial determinant of workers morale. Those settings are affected by social strategic complementarity that may yield to pareto-rankable multiple equilibria. We introduce instruments that should favor the functioning of the matching process and advocate their implementation to foster an internally-driven sectorial development process.

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    Paper provided by Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit in its series AICCON Working Papers with number 4-2004.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: 20 Dec 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ris:aiccon:2004_004
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    1. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, . "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IEW - Working Papers 095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Lanse Minkler, 2002. "Shirking and Motivations in Firms: Survey Evidence on Worker Attitudes," Working papers 2002-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2002. "What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 402-435, June.
    5. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-55, September.
    6. Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
    7. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Pay Enough Or Don'T Pay At All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810, August.
    8. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, . "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," IEW - Working Papers 015, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Preston, Anne E, 1989. "The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(4), pages 438-63, October.
    10. Pelligra Vittorio, 2002. "Rispondenza fiduciaria: principi e implicazioni per la progettazione istituzionale," Stato e mercato, SocietĂ  editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 335-358.
    11. Vittorio PELLIGRA, 2003. "Le determinanti "civili" dello sviluppo economico," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 111(4), pages 553-580.
    12. Leete, Laura, 2000. "Wage equity and employee motivation in nonprofit and for-profit organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 423-446, December.
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