IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper

Fee Structure, Financing, and Investment Decisions: The Case of REITs

  • Pierpaolo Pattitoni

    ()

    (Department of Management, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Rimini, Italy)

  • Barbara Petracci

    ()

    (Department of Management, University of Bologna, Italy)

  • Massimo Spisni

    ()

    (Department of Management, University of Bologna, Italy)

We propose a model to show how the fee structure of listed Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) can increase instead of decrease Management Company opportunistic behaviors. Distinguishing between performance fees paid on the fund market value and management fees paid either on the Net Asset Value (NAV) or on the Gross Asset Value (GAV), we show that only the former aligns the Management Company and shareholder interests. In particular, we demonstrate that management fees lead Management Companies to make suboptimal financing and investment decisions in order to maximize their own wealth at the expense of shareholders. We test the predictions of the model empirically using a panel of Italian listed REITs.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp30_11.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 30_11.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:30_11
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Via Patara, 3, 47921 Rimini (RN)

Phone: +390541434142
Fax: +39054155431
Web page: http://www.rcfea.org
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1972. "On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 339, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Robichek, Alexander A. & Myers, Stewart C., 1966. "Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 1-35, June.
  3. Bing Han, 2006. "Insider Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 471-493, June.
  4. Marco Bigelli & Stefano Mengoli, 2004. "Sub-Optimal Acquisition Decisions under a Majority Shareholder System," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 373-405, October.
  5. repec:arz:wpaper:eres2003_255 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Shaun A. Bond & G. Andrew Karolyi & Anthony B. Sanders, 2003. "International Real Estate Returns: A Multifactor, Multicountry Approach," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 481-500, 09.
  7. Massimo Biasin & Anna Grazia Quaranta, 2010. "Effects of Regulatory and Market Constraints on the Capital Structure and Share Value of REITs: Evidence from the Italian Market," International Real Estate Review, Asian Real Estate Society, vol. 13(3), pages 282-322.
  8. Ling, David C & Naranjo, Andy, 2002. "Commercial Real Estate Return Performance: A Cross-Country Analysis," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1-2), pages 119-42, Jan.-Marc.
  9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Capozza, Dennis R & Seguin, Paul J, 2000. "Debt, Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 91-116, March.
  11. Andrea Melis, 2000. "Corporate Governance in Italy," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 347-355, October.
  12. Andy C. W. Chui & Sheridan Titman & K. C. John Wei, 2003. "The Cross Section of Expected REIT Returns," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 451-479, 09.
  13. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
  14. Dennis R. Capozza & Sohan Lee, 1995. "Property Type, Size, and REIT Value," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 10(4), pages 363-380.
  15. Ghosh, Chinmoy & Sirmans, C F, 2003. "Board Independence, Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 287-318, March-May.
  16. Dennis R. Capozza & Paul J. Seguin, 1999. "Focus, Transparency and Value: The REIT Evidence," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 587-619.
  17. repec:arz:wpaper:eres2008_212 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Ko Wang & John Erickson & Su Han Chan, 1995. "Does the REIT Stock Market Resemble the General Stock Market?," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 10(4), pages 445-460.
  19. H. Swint Friday & G. Stacy Sirmans, 1998. "Board of Director Monitoring and Firm Value in REITs," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 16(3), pages 411-427.
  20. Dennis R. Capozza & Paul J. Seguin, 2003. "Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q-Ratios: Evidence from REITs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 367-404, 09.
  21. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  22. K. C. Chan & Patric H. Hendershott & Anthony B. Sanders, 1990. "Risk and Return on Real Estate: Evidence from Equity REITs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 18(4), pages 431-452.
  23. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  24. Lynne B. Sagalyn, 1990. "Real Estate Risk and the Business Cycle: Evidence from Security Markets," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 5(2), pages 203-220.
  25. Richard J. Barkham & Charles W. R. Ward, 1999. "Investor Sentiment and Noise Traders: Discount to Net Asset Value in Listed Property Companies in the U.K," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 18(2), pages 291-312.
  26. James L. Kuhle & Carl H. Walther & Charles H. Wurtzebach, 1986. "The Financial Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 1(1), pages 67-75.
  27. repec:jss:jstsof:25:c01 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N, 1987. " Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decision s," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(4), pages 823-37, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:30_11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marco Savioli)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.