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A Theory of Targeted Search

  • Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria

    (The Ohio State University)

  • Antonella Tutino

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas)

  • Anton Cheremukhin

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas)

We develop a model of matching where participants have finite information processing capacity. The equilibrium of our model covers the middle ground between the equilibria of random matching and the directed search literatures and reproduces them as limiting cases. Our theory of targeted search generates a unique equilibrium which is generally inefficient.

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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2013 Meeting Papers with number 664.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed013:664
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