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Rational Inattention in Hiring Decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Sushant Acharya
  • Shu Lin Wee

Abstract

We provide an information-based theory of matching efficiency fluctuations. Rationally inattentive firms have limited capacity to process information and cannot perfectly identify suitable applicants. During recessions, higher losses from hiring unsuitable workers cause firms to be more selective in hiring. When firms cannot obtain sufficient information about applicants, they err on the side of caution and accept fewer applicants to minimize losses from hiring unsuitable workers. Pro-cyclical acceptance rates drive a wedge between meeting and hiring rates, explaining fluctuations in matching efficiency. Quantitatively, our model replicates the joint behavior of unemployment rates and matching efficiency observed since the Great Recession.

Suggested Citation

  • Sushant Acharya & Shu Lin Wee, 2020. "Rational Inattention in Hiring Decisions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-40, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:12:y:2020:i:1:p:1-40
    DOI: 10.1257/mac.20180390
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Carrillo-Tudela & Hermann Gartner & Leo Kaas, 2023. "Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates, and Matching Efficiency," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2413-2459.
    2. Isaac Baley & Ana Figueiredo & Robert Ulbricht, 2022. "Mismatch Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(11), pages 2943-2984.
    3. Isaac Baley & Laura Veldkamp, 2021. "Bayesian learning," Economics Working Papers 1797, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    4. Matveenko, Andrei & Mikhalishchev, Sergei, 2021. "Attentional role of quota implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    5. Jeong Ho (John) Kim & Kyungmin Kim & Marilyn Pease, 2024. "Unemployment Duration Under Flexible Information Acquisition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(1), pages 471-503, February.
    6. Alexander Lam, 2022. "Canada’s Beveridge curve and the outlook for the labour market," Staff Analytical Notes 2022-18, Bank of Canada.
    7. Alex Bloedel & Tommaso Denti & Luciano Pomatto, 2025. "Modeling information acquisition via f-divergence and duality," Papers 2510.03482, arXiv.org.
    8. Macaulay, Alistair, 2021. "The attention trap: Rational inattention, inequality, and fiscal policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    9. Dominik Naeher, 2022. "Technology Adoption Under Costly Information Processing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 699-753, May.
    10. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 226-273, March.
    11. Melcangi, Davide & Turen, Javier, 2023. "Subsidizing startups under imperfect information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 93-109.
    12. Acharya, Sushant & Benhabib, Jess & Huo, Zhen, 2021. "The anatomy of sentiment-driven fluctuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    13. David Walker-Jones, 2019. "Rational Inattention and Perceptual Distance," Papers 1909.00888, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2019.
    14. Alexandros Botsis & Christoph Görtz & Plutarchos Sakellaris, 2020. "Quantifying Qualitative Survey Data: New Insights on the (Ir)Rationality of Firms' Forecasts," CESifo Working Paper Series 8148, CESifo.
    15. Walker-Jones, David, 2023. "Rational inattention with multiple attributes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    16. Serdar Birinci & Kurt See & Shu Lin Wee, 2020. "Job Applications and Labor Market Flows," Working Papers 2020-023, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised Jan 2023.
    17. Vania Esady, 2022. "Real and nominal effects of monetary shocks under time-varying disagreement," Bank of England working papers 1007, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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