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Holdups and Overinvestment in Physical Capital Markets with Matching Frictions

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  • Andre Kurmann

    (Universite du Quebec a Montreal)

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  • Andre Kurmann, 2008. "Holdups and Overinvestment in Physical Capital Markets with Matching Frictions," 2008 Meeting Papers 839, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:839
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierre Cahuc & Francois Marque & Etienne Wasmer, 2008. "A Theory Of Wages And Labor Demand With Intra-Firm Bargaining And Matching Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 943-972, August.
    2. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 195-222, March.
    3. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-849, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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